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THE 'RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT' AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICA
Rose D'Sa
The collection of papers included in this Symposium aim to examine
the Issues involved in Human Rights and Development. It is necessary for
the purpose of understanding the context in which my paper is written, to
explain that human rights are, by definition, the rights of individual
human beings. International Law, on the other hand, is concerned mainly
with relations between states, and the individual is rarely the subject
of rights or obligations in the context of Public International Law.
This paper is therefore not concerned, unlike some of the other
contributions, with the possible area of overlap between human rights and
development, but focusses exclusively on the right to development and the
issue of its international enforcement by states rather than by private
individuals. It is also restricted to that aspect of development related
to economic issues, with specific reference to one continent, namely
Africa.
The call by developing states for the New International Economic
Order was officially proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1974 in its Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Orderl and the Programme of Action in the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order.2 Later the same
year, the United Nations strengthened the impetus for change by adopting
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.3 The need for a
most thorough reappraisal of international economic and financial
relationships had been growing since the end of the Second World War but
probably reached its height around 1973 when the five fold increase in
the price of crude petroleum made dramatically clear the inequities and
imbalances of the present international economic system.4 In essence,
the world economic order at the moment can be summarized as being based
on an international division of labour in which 7M of the nations in the
world are in the position of being the suppliers of raw materials, in
exchange for finished products. They are therefore not participators in
the high, value added activities of processing and manufacture.
Furthermore, as a result of the present international monetary system
being tailored to the needs of the developed countries and hence to their
domestic economies, any inflation in these economies will directly a-17ecT
their terms of trade with the developing countries and thus the terms on
which raw materials and primary products are traded for manufactured
goods.
The movement towards a change in the present system and the creation
of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) has broadly two
objectives.5 Firstly, it emphasises that every state should have
control over its natural resources. This was the result of a shift in
priority brought about by the attainment of independence by a large
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number of new states. Attention shifted from the political aspects of
colonialism to economic issues. In particular, the new members of the
international community showed a growing awareness that political
independence alone was not enough.
Secondly, the claim for a NIEO, is concerned with the various ways
that more developed states can help the less developed nations to develop
their economies through a comprehensive reform of existing international
trade relations. International economic law necessarily encompasses the
international law of development because the latter is clearly in part
related to economic growth. There is, however, a part of development
which is not related to economic growth such as social development,
culture and even political progress.6 It has also been argued7 that
the very purpose of this new Order also goes beyond the economic sphere
and extends to the development of "all men and women, and every aspect of
the individual, in a comprehensive cultural process, deeply permeated
with values and embracing the natural environment, social relationships,
education and welfare."8  In other words, it is illusory to assume that
a NIEO will be brought about simply by changing international economic
structures. It is also necessary to achieve changes in the social and
economic structures of each country so as to provide for a more equitable
internal distribution of resources. Such a change would clearly have to
be implemented within the domestic framework of individual states. The
call for a NIEO can therefore be looked at from both a national and an
international perspective. However, for the purpose of this paper,
discussion is limited to those aspects of the international law of
development which do fall within the scope of international economic law,
and in particular to the second objective of the NIEO, namely a reform of
the present structure of international trade. This aspect of development
will then be analysed with specific reference to the African continent.
It is clear that within the framework of international development
law, any reference to a 'right of development' necessarily implies the
existence of a duty to promote economic growth. There is no reason in
principle why this right cannot exist. However, problems arise in
connection with two main issues. Firstly, who is the holder of such a
right and on whom do the duties or obligations correlated with this right
fall? The first question presupposes that the right to development has a
determinate content which defines the frame of reference in which it
operates. The second issue can be looked at in a different way, namely
is the right to development a legal right, or is it a mere political
theory or moral principle?
The right to development appears to have been originally conceived of
as a right within the international sphere, being a right of political
entities, states and peoples subjugated to foreign or colonial
domination.9 In the context of international law, the holder of this
right.could be states, particularly the underdeveloped nations, while the
corresponding duty or obligation to achieve the goals of development is
placed on the international community, especially the developed nations.
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It has been suggested by some jurists that the right to development is
also a right in municipal law. When the existence of such a right was
first propounded it was originally conceived of as a collective right,
but has since expanded to encompass the idea of a right to development as
a human right, that is a right belonging to individuals.10 The
juridical basis for the recognition of a right to development in
municipal law is, however, beyond the ambit of this paper. I propose to.
limit discussion to the possible legal content of the right to
development, in the context of. relations between states within the NIEO.
This involves an investigation into the question as to whether there
is a legal duty on the developed nations of the world co-operate with the
Third World so as to bring about development through economic growth.
Some writers take the view that there is already such a legal obligation
in existence on the grounds of necessity, namely that interdependence
between states is a reality of international relations and this is
recognized by the existence of a binding duty of co-operation in
international law.1l The idea of the mutual interdependence of nation
states was advanced with great conviction by the Brandt Commission12
which conducted an extensive examination of the issues involved in
North-South dialogue between 1978 and 1980. The Commission's terms of
reference included paying careful attention to the U.N. resolutions and
those of other international fora on development and related issues. Its
report stressed the fact that there was a common interest between North
and South and that tne search for solutions is a condition of mutual
economic survival for the future.13 This viewpoint is re-emphasized in
the most recent report of the Brandt Commission, published in 1983.14
Although the Brandt Commission Reports are cohesive and
thought-provoking analyses of the problems of development finance in its
international context, they have so far failed to create a sense of
urgency or to convince the Western decision-makers of their central theme
of mutual economic interdependence.15 This is partly due to the fact
that while the assumption of mutuality of interest is superficially
attractive, it ignores some realities of international trade. These
suggest, for instance, that while expanded markets in the South are
clearly beneficial, they can also cause destructive competition in
Northern domestic markets, so that the concept of mutual benefit is nct
as straightforward a proposition as it first seems. Secondly, it is
important to recognize that even if economic development along the lines
proposed by the Commission weie achieved, the linear expansion of the
Gross National Product of a country would not necessarily reflect
corresponding human haooiness or fulfilment.16
However, whatever the practical and moral merits of the argument
advanced by the Brandt Commission and other commentators for improving
the economic plight of the Third World, these are not enough to endow the
'right to development' with legal force. On the contrary, the language
of many international instruments on this subject amount only to
declarations or proposals of what the legal rules relating to development
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should be, rather than an embodiment of already existing legal rules on
the subject. This conclusion can be supported first of all by reference
to the language used, for instance in the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States of the U.N. mentioned earlier. The obligatory language
.of the original draft was in fact amended in significant respects,
indicating that the intention of states proposing the resolution was to
put it forward as a policy prescription, rather than as a document having
the force of a treaty, codifying and developing legal rules.17 This is
reinforced by the fact that the Charter coversa very wide range of
issues, from a pronouncement on the elimination of apartheid (Article 16)
to environmental policy (Article 30), which creates the impression that
the provisions were not meant to be of normative value.
However, a number of arguments have been advanced in favour of
regarding General Assembly resolutions as having legal effect. The first
is that advocated by the dissenting Japanese Judge Tanaka in the South
West Africa cases,l namely that General Assembly resolutions relating
to apartheid are, Decause of their continuous repetition, evidence of
customary international law. However, many would argue that whilst such
resolutions might be evidence of opinio juris, an element of usage or
state practice has also to be present for them to contribute towards the
formation of customary international law. 19 Another view is that
General Assembly resolutions on human rights issues such as apartheid are
valid legal interpretations of the Charter. However, it must be borne in
mind that there is no exclusive right of interpretation of the Charter
given to any U.N. organ and that the General Assembly has certainly not
been specifically allocated any such function in the field of human
rights. An interesting theory advanced by O'Amato,20 posits that, if
international law is nothing more or less than what States think it is,
then do not particular rules of international law owe their existence to
the flow of international consensus? On this view, consensus is not
merely a law creating process but rather consensus is international law.
This means that what states believe to be the law is law. The question
then arises: What do states believe? Obviously, unanimous consent to a
General Assembly Resolution suggests that it is in fact a rule. However,
what if the consent is nearly unarimous but not totally so and there are
in fact few states who either abstain or vote against? This has often
been the case in the long history of debates on topics such as
colonialism and apartheid. Is there now a rule that declares that a
significant, that is an overwhelming majority, is sufficient to bring
about a legislative effect? It would be safe to say that this is not
felt to be the position as yet, even though some such as Falk21 have
argued that the trend is in that direction. At the moment, dissenting
States are not bound by General Assembly resolutions and whether
assenting States are so bound must, according to D'Amato,22 still await
the consensual development of a rule to that effect. Thus, at present,
according to an objective analysis of accepted sources of international
law, General Assembly resolutions of this nature Oo not, in any event,
have binding legal effect except insofar as they declare existing rules
of international law.23 Nevertheless, it is clear that such
resolutions can be evidence
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of the opinio Juris of states. In this connection, the Texaco case24
is of interest. It involved a dispute between Libya and two U.S. oil
companies over nationalization measures. Professor Dupuy, the
Arbitrator, held that neither the Declaration and Programme of Action nor
the Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States could be regarded as
stating customary international law. In his opinion they were de lege
ferenda and not a statement of current law because they lacked the
measure of general support necessary to give them legal effect. In
particular, they were not supported by any of the developed countries
with market economies which carry on the biggest part of international
trade. 25
The problem inherent in deriving binding legal rules relates partly
to content. The word "economic" can cover an enormous diversity of
economic activity. Law itself cannot be neutral and value-free - it is
necessary to reconcile sometimes opposite view points on international
economic issues, as world trade is complex and involves diverse economic
and political interests. Secondly, it does not seem practical when an
attempt is made to lay down rules governing relations between states, to
ignore the great economic power of private business enterprise which is
intrinsically tied into the very nature of world trading activity and
which can extensively influence the political decisions of world
leaders. To illustrate, it would be wishful thinking to develop rules
governing the energy policy of a country in which Mobil, Texaco or Shell,
or instance, or even a consortium of similar multinational companies,
effectively own and control the prospecting, mining and marketing of that
country's resources, without taking the latter situation into account.
However, despite the problems involved in creating NIEO of a legally
binding nature, there has been wide support for a discussion of the legal
issues in many international fora. One positive step has been taken
within UNCTAD where negotiations have led, after four years of tough
negotiations, to the conclusion, on 27th June, 1980, of an agreement
establishing a Common Fund for stabilising raw material prices and a set
of rules and principles regarding restrictive business practices.
Although this agreement has yet to be ratified26 it is a step in the
direction of a fairer distribution of the world's riches. Products
affected by its operation will be primarily copper, cocoa and
coffee.27 The Fund sets an important precedent in that its voting
structure is not rigorously tied to financial contributions and poor
countries in fact have the largest voting share (47). This achievement
must be regarded as a positive step of a binding legal nature, towards
the fulfilment of the principles originally laid down in the Declaration
and-Programme of Action of 1975.28
Another positive step in the direction of creating binding rules of
law in this relatively new area is the progress which has been made by
the International Law Commissior 9 (ILC) in submitting a final set of
draft articles on "the most favoured nation claOse" (car.-ing out a
General Assembly recommendation originally made in 1976).-O It is
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significant that the ILC decided in 1976 to place this topic on its
programme as legal clarification might be of assistance to the work of
UNICTRAL as well as of interest in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly. 3 1 There are numerous reasons for regarding the topic of the
*most-favoured nation clause as being of fundamental importance for
international relations. The clause has been described as one of the
soundest institutions of international treaty law, occupying a
fundamental position in the treaty practice of states.3 2 The use of
the clause has also enabled world trade to be expanded and liberalized on
the basis of non-discrimination and the equality of sovereign states. As
such, it should serve a useful purpose in helping to eliminate inequality
and discrimination in economic relations between developed and developing
countries, and for this reason the dominant aspect of debates in the ILC
and the Sixth Committee has been the role and place of the most favoured
nation clause in the formation of legal rules which could contribute to
the establishment of the NIEO. 3 3
In the final set of draft articles submitted by the ILC to the
General Assembly, 3 4 the most-favoured nation clause is defined in
Article 4 as:
a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes an
obligation towards another State to accord
most-favoured nation treatment in an agreed sphere
of relations.
The most-favoured nation treatment is defined in Article 5 as:
treatment accorded by the granting State to the
beneficiary State, or to persons or things in a
determined relationship with that State, not less
favourable3 5 than treatment extended by the
granting State to a third State or to persons or
things in the same relationship with that third
State.
The Commission thus treated the most-favoured nation clause as a
technique or means for promoting the equality of states or
non-discrimination. However, if the clause were to be seen only in this
context, then it would clearly fail to take cognizance of the fact that
in a world which consists of states whose economic development is
strikingly unequal, the most-favoured nation clause could be used as a
device to perpetuate inequity. As indicated in the report prepared by
the Secretariat of the UNCTAD ("the UNCTAD memorandum") 3 6 "application
of the most-favoured nation clause to all countries regardless of their
level of development could satisfy the conditions of formal equality, but
would in fact involve implicit discrimination against the weakest members
of the international community."
The Commission therefore took into account the different levels of
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economic development of states and took action to advance the interests
of the developing countries in the field of international trade, by the
inclusion of draft articles 23, 24 and 30. These draft articles,
discussed below, show that the ILC did not confine itself to codifying
existing rules but aimed at the progressive development of international
law so as to take account of the fact that the trade needs of the
developing countries differed from those of the developed countries.37
Article 23 deals with the most-favoured nation clause in relation to
treatment under a generalized system of preference and states that:
A beneficiary State is not entitled under a
most-favoured nation clause to treatment extended
by a developed granting State to a developing
third State- on a non-reciprocal basis, within
a scheme of generalized preferences established by
that granting State, which conforms with a
generalized system of preferences recognized by
the international community of states as a whole
or for the States members of a competent
international organization, adopted in accordance
with its relevant rules and procedures.
Article 24 deals with the most-favoured nation clause in relation to
arrangements between developing states themselves and provides that:
A developed beneficiary State is not entitled
under a most-favoured nation clause to any
preferential treatment in the field of trade
extended by a developing granting State to a
developing third State, in conformity with the
relevant rules and procedures of a competent
international organization of which the States
concerned are members.
Articles 23 and 24 therefore effectively provide for important
exceptions to the application of the most-favcured nation clause.
When speaking of Article 23, the Commission stated in its report 3 9
that there seems to be a general agreement that States will refrain from
invoking their rights to most--favoured nation treatment, with a view to
obtaining in whole or in part the preferential treatment granted to
developing countries by developed countries. Accordingly contracting
parties to the GATT have waived (subject to certain conditions) their
rights to most-favoured nation treatment under Article 1 of the General
Agreement.40 The Commission's approach, as evidenced in Article 24,
demonstrates that the importance of trade expansion, economic
co-operation and integration among developing countries, whether within
organized economic groupings or otherwise, have clearly been accepted as
important elements of an "international development strategy" and have
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accordingly been given some measure of legal protection.
Furthermore, Article 30 states that:
the present articles are without prejudice to the
establishment of new rules of international law in
favour of developing countries.
In this regard, the-Commission felt that it could not enter into a
field outside the scope of its mandate, namely the promotion of the trade
prospects of developing countries with a view to their economic
development in areas other than those to which Articles 23 and 24 refer,
but instead decided to draft an article which left the matter open for
future development within the international community. The argument
which the ILC put forward in support of this reasoning was that it did
not feel it had sufficient information on the relevant doctrines and
practice of international development law to enable it to formulate
existing rules.41 It is interesting therefore that when the Sixth
Committee reviewed the Commission's report, it maintained that this
argument was incorrect and that in reality the beginnings of an
international development law already existed in the general principles
established and sanctioned by the General Assembly, in resolutions 2626
(XXV) (concerning the International Development Strategy), 3201 (S-VI)
and 3202 (S-VI) (known as the Declaration and Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a NIEO) and 3281 (XXX) concerning the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.4 2 Nevertheless, although the ILC
had not attempted to codify and define legal rules from the above texts,
draft articles 23, 24 and 30 nave made a noteworthy contribution towards
the establishment of the NIEO,43 since the Commission clearly showed
that it was possible to draw up rules of international law which were
universal in scope and were in favour of the developing countries.
Although these rules are of a somewhat minimal character they do
nevertheless stand a chance of being included and adopted in an
international convention.
Finally, it is apparent from the legal definition of the
most-favoured nation clause that it is, in its simplest form, of a
unilateral nature. One state, the granting state, gives a legal
undertaking and the other state, is the beneficiary. The clause
accordingly takes on a unilateral character. A similar clause could be
those in which most-favoured nation treatment is accorded to the ships of
a land-locked state in the ports and harbours of the granting maritime
state. Since the land-locked state is not in a position to offer in
return the same kind of treatment, the clause remains unilateral.
(However, the same treaty may of course provide for another type of
concession). In the African context, the use of the clause in relation
to landlocked states is by no means irrelevant since the greatest number
of landlocked countries are to be found within the African continent.
Hence Article 126 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,44
provides for the exclusion of the application of the most-favoured nation
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clause from provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention relating to
special rights accorded to landlocked states. Thus, although it is now
widely accepted that such unilateral clauses are exceptional today and
that the more usual case is for both states' parties to a treaty to
accord each other similar treatmen-, it is submitted that the legal
possibility of 'unilateral' most-favoured nation treatment is of
importance in certain cases such as that illustrated above, as well as
being in conformity with the general demand by developing countries for a
NIEO. The unilateral clause is clearly in keeping with Third World
demands for preferential and non-reciprocal treatment in trade.45
However, despite this evidence of some progress towards the
establishment of a right to development within international legal
framework, there has been a much longer list of failures or setbacks to
the creation of a NIEO. Recent examples of these include the objection
of a number of states such as the U.S. and the U.K. to the deep sea-bed
mining provisions of the.Law of the Sea Treaty, the reduction of funds
for the International Development Association (the World Bank's
concessional lending arm) and generally worsening trade conditions. The
overall impression must be that the creation of a de jure NIEO is far
from being a reality and the world economy is still essentially divided
into two groups, the developing and the industrialized nations, with
co-operation towards development remaining painfully slow at the present
time.
While the global economic problems facing'states, particularly those
in the Third World, have a serious and urgent character, the prospects
for African countries are particularly gloomy. Africa contains 21 of the
world's 45 least developed states and during much of the past decade,
prospects for progress and development have been inauspicious. Africa's
total gross national product accounts for only 2.7% of the world's
product and Africa has the lowest average per capita income in the world(at 365 dollars), while its infant mortality rate (at 157 per 1000) is
the world's highest. Unemployment now affects 45Y of the active
population. In rural areas there is, on average, only one doctor for
every 26,000 inhabitants. Worse still, Africa is excessively dependent
on other countries even for food. Trade and commercial exchanoes are
almost invariably in a "North South" direction with the inevitable
consequences of deteriorating terms of trade, outward orientation of
production, little domestic processing of raw materials.46 and balance
of payments problems. How did this sorry state of affairs come about?
To begin with, the world economic situation as a whole is itself a source
of serious concern. In almost all industrial countries, there is a
recession with a corresponding slow-down in the growth of world trade.
The developing countries such as those in Africa are invariably the ones
which in the present international economic system, suffer most from the
side effects of a recession. However, it must be stressed that these
shortcomings are not to be found merely at the international level. It
is also clear that internal African development strategies have in the
past achieved only very poor results.47
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Thus, although a number of unresolved international problems exist in
translating the development needs of states into a legal right, African
countries have also had to face their own difficulties at a regional
level. This is not to suggest that they have abandoned prospects of
eventually attaining the desired New Economic Order on an international
level but rather that the use of the world 'international' in the context
of development, may be legitimately applied to regional as well as global
arrangements to achieve the desired goals.48 For instance, both the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties and the Declaration of the Sixth
Special session of the General Assembly expressly recognize that the U.N.
is not the only forum for discussion of the relevant issues. It is
submitted that African nations are increasingly aware that while
continuing to pursue their efforts for changes at an international level,
they must also look for ways and means through which they themselves,
acting.collectively, can improve their own economic position on a
regional and sub-regional basis.
One of the most recent and significant regional initiatives has been
undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which is the sole
organization with a continent-wide membership in Africa.4 9 Although
the principal objectives of the OAU Charter relate to the political goals
of African solidarity (Art. II(a)(a)) and the total eradication of
colonialism (Art. II(l)(d)), the Chartei also refers to the aim of
economic and social development.. The Preamble states that the OAU Member
States are conscious of their "responsibility to harness the natural and
human resources of the continent -for the total advancement of our
peoples..." and Art. II(l)(b) also reiterates the need for African states
"to co-ordinate and intensify" their "co-operation and efforts to achieve
a better life for the peoples of Africa." The OAU"s aims in this area
were subsequently elaborated in a Memorandum ratified by the 7th Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in
197050 which reaffirms the responsibilities and the role of the
Organization in the economic and-social field. Since then, the African
Ministerial Conference on Trade, Development and Monetary Problems,
jointly sponsored by the OAU, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
and the Africa Development Bank, prepared a Declaration in 1973 which was
subsequently adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at
its 10th Ordinary session, entitled the "OAU Declaration on Co-operation,
Development and Economic Independence."'51 This document expressed its
concern for the "ineffectiveness of the measures adopted during the past
decade to combat under-development" as well as "the inability of the
international community to create conditicns favourable for the
development of Africa." With regard to the former, the Declaration
reiterated the conviction that mobilization of the African continent's
resources could yet lead to a rapid transformation of the African
economies and raise the peoples' standard of living.
The essential emphasis of the Declaration was on economic
co-operation and integration between African countries with respect to
their human and material resources. The theme of regional co-operation
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was put forward as a solution to both internal development problems as
well as the problem of improving the external conditions necessary for
promoting African development, by facilitating a common front, a common
economic policy, in the belief that "unity is strength" and that
political co-ordination on economic issues would improve Africa's
bargaining position internationally. The goal of regional collective
self-reliance was a practical and useful objective, but the political
initiatives for implementation were left to individual member states.
In 1979 the OAU organized a symposium of great importance on the
future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000. It was
attended by African experts in various fields who took part in their
personal capacity, and was financed by the United Nations' Development
Programme (UNOD) and the ECA. It resulted in the drafting of a document
which has come to be known as the "Lagos Plan of Action"5 which was
adopted by all 53 member states of the OAU. The plan5 3 aims at the
creation of an African Common Market to be established by the year 2000.
This Common Market is to be based on existing and planned regional
economic communities of the continent, such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). Two ten year stages are envisaged. The
emphasis is on encouraging and building upon existing regional and
sub-regional groupings rather than trying to launch entirely new
institutions.
In this connection, the formation of ECOWAS (whose 16 members began
implementation of the Community's deta,4ed programme in June 1981), is an
important step in the right direction., This programme aims at
uniting members into a regional common market, which will stretch over a
vast area, 2000 miles from Mauritania to Nigeria and 1,500 miles from the
Sahara to the Atlantic. The Common Market consists of a free trade area
with tariffs on unprocessed goods being gradually eliminated by member
countries. It includes a common customs tariff (with compensation from
the ECOWAS Fund for members who might lose revenue as a result), and by
gradual stages ECOWAS will introduce totally free movement of the
citizens of ECOWAS states. However, one of the goals includes that of a
common currency, and it remains to be seen whether this will be
achieved.55 Although there are a number of other important economic
institutions also situated in the same region, an economic community for
the West African sub-region, if successfully implemented, woulo
constitute one of the greatest developments in the economic history of
the sub-region.56 As such, it should provide positive impetus for the
principles laid down in the Lagos Plan. Some evidence of such an impetus
is the signing of a treaty establishing a Preferential Trade Area in May
1981 by 9 Heads of State and Government of Eastern and Southern African
countries, a treaty aimed at leading eventually to the creation of an
economic community of states in the region.57 The Southern African
Development Co-ordination Conference (SAOCC) of nine Southern African
countries held in Lusaka in April 1980 is another example of the strategy
of regional-collective self-reliance.58 However, although the Lagos
Plan contains specific, action-oriented targets, it relies for its
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success on the close collaboration and political will of individual
African countries. Nevertheless, the development plan. for the year 2000
is an important landmark in the efforts of African countries as a whole
to bring about, through their own regional efforts, significant
•improvements of, their development prospects. Whether the ultimate
realization of a continental economic union is ever achieved, is a
question that time will answer.
In 1981, the Eighteenth Assembly Meeting of the OAU Heads of State
and Government signed the African Charter of Human and Peoples'
Rights.59 This Charter also refers to a right of all peoples to
"economic social and cultural development" and reiterates that "States
shall have the duty, individually or collectively to ensure the exercise
of the right to development." (Art.22(2)). This Charter will come into
legal force when a simple majority of OAU Member States ratify or adhere
to it. Its wording is of legal interest because it refers to a peoples'
right of economic development and places a corresponding duty on states
to enforce this right. However, what seems important in the context of
this paper is that it clearly does not advance any further the legal
concept of a right to development by African or other Third World
countries vis A vis the developed nations.60
One final aspect of the African (regional) strategy for development
remains to be considered. It will be recalled that the new emphasis on
co-operation and integration as embodied in the OAU Declaration on
Co-operation Development and Economic Independence61 contained sections
dealing not only with trade among African states themselves, but also
between African states as a whole with the developed market economies.
The main principle was that of co-ordination and harmonization of the
African stand during all negotiations with developed countries in order
to safeguard the interests of African countries as a whole.62 A
significant example of this principle being carried into effect, is
afforded by the successful conclusion of the Lomd (II) Convention between
the nine members of the European Economic Community and 58 African,
Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) on 31st October, 1979. This is the
second Convention governing trade and other relations between the two
groups; 63 (the first Lom6 convention expired on March 1st, 1980). It
provides for a comprehensive range of measures from traditional financial
co-operation to the stabilization of export earnings, trade and
industrial co-operation.64 In the context of both African Development
policy and the present failure of the North/South dialogue, ft is
submitted that the Convention is a significant achievement which is
consistent with the spirit of the proposed NIEO.
One aspect of the call for reform at the international level relates
to the need for financial aid on a long-term basis to African states to
facilitate their economic recovery and growth. The aid promised under
the new Lom6 Convention amounts to a sum of $7,457 million over the next
five years.6 5 While the ACP countries maintain that this figure is not
enough to ensure progress in such crucial areas as industrial
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co-operation, they do agree that the Convention does represent in terms
of North-South co-operation if not a great leap, at least a firm stride
forward.66 Another aspect of trade co-operation intended to favour the
developing countries is that 99.5% of ACP products will enjoy duty-free
access to markets within the EEC and this is to be non-reciprocal so that
ACP states are free to apply their normal customs duties on products
imported from the EEC. This is in keeping with Third World demands for
preferential and non-reciprocal treatment in tradeb7 and is a practical
example of the use of unilateral most-favoured nation clauses. One of
the most original features of the Convention is the Stabilization of
Export Earnings from Commodities (STABEX) which guarantees ACP states a
stable level of export earnings from (a now increased number of) basic
commodities exported to EEC markets. It originally covered 26
agricultural raw products essential to the economies of the ACP
countries. This grew to 34 under the Lom& I Convention and ten
additional products are now included.68
The scheme comes into operation in the form of a direct transfer of
funds whenever there is a significant drop in a member country's export
earnings for any one of the commodities covered. STABEX transfers to the
35 least developed countries are made in the form of grants and for other
countries they consist of interest-free loans under flexible terms. In
order to qualify, the country concerned must have a specified
"dependence" threshold, that is a certain proportion of that country's
total budget must be covered by the product concerned, and its export
earnings for that "qualifying" product must also drop below a certain
level known as the "trigger threshold."
However, although STABEX is of considerable importance and benefit to
ACP countries, it is limited in that it covers only primary products and
not finished (processed) goods. Secondly, although increased financial
resources are available under Lomb II, the lowness of payments has been
criticized.69 Thirdly, since the reference period for calculating the
correct price of the export earning stabilization is continually
changing, today's earnings become tomorrow's norms so that theoretically
a price, however low, eventually becomes normal over a period of
time.70 Nevertheless, STABEX does play a role in preventing the
disruptive effects of fluctuations in the price of raw materials (a major
scourge facing developing countries) and in this respect represents an
advance in favour of the Third World. Under Lom6 II, minerals have also
been included in a similar scheme to safeguard and develop production.
The assistance takes the form of an "accident" insurance scheme (known as
Sysmin or Minex) backed by financial aid in situations where either local
or economic factors cause a significant drop in a country's export
production or earnings. However, unlike STABEX, the help does not take
the form of a straight budget transfer but of special loans to finance
projects or programmes proposed by the ACP country to restore production
and exports.71 - There are also new chapters in Lom& II on co-operation
in various fields such as energy policy, agricultural development and
humar rights. However, despite the undoubted concessions made to the ACP
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participants, it cannot be said that the Convention has really changed
relations between the North and the South. Such a dramatic result would
clearly have received international attention, which has not been the
case. Nor has there been any evidence of a dramatic improvement in the
economic situation of the ACP countries particularly vis vis the
non-Lomb developing countries (although it should not be overlooked that
certain ACP countries may have been much worse off had it not been for
EEC aid). Thus, in the global context of relations between developing
countries and their richer partners, nothing has changed much.72
However, the successful conclusion of Lome II and the co-operative
efforts which were undertaken in 1974 during Lom& I, have helped to set
solid foundations for renewed and more productive joint co-operation in
the future, both between the developing countries themselves (since even
ACP countries who are at war with one another can be expected to discuss
investment projects) as well as relations between the Third World and
Europe. The proposals submitted by the European Commission to the
Council of Ministers regarding the negotiations for Lom& III which are
now underway, also stress their aspect, calling for Lome III to be a
convention of indefinite duration, thereby signifying strong political
commitment and a belief in the durability of the co-operation system.73
Thirdly, the Convention represents concrete evidence of the renewed
determination of Third World countries to adopt a united approach aimed
at securing a fairer distribution of the world's wealth and resources.
Thus, while the Lome Convention continues to symbolize, according to some
authorities, proof of Europe's commitment to a more just and equitable
International Economic Order, others regard it as a mere 'face-saving
device' whicn allows some Northern states to appear to be generous
without actually giving up any privileges. The Convention nevertheless
represents a real achievement. It seems that although Europe and other
Western States have appeared in the past to block proposals for concrete
reform, Europe has expressed willingness to do something to assist
developing states through Lom& II. The Convention appears to represent
progress, however small, towards a new and more equitable International
Economic Order.
in conclusion, there is very limited evidence for the existence of a
legal right to development in favour of Third World countries such as
those in Africa. However, there is clearly a growing awareness
internationally of the need for some progressive development of the law
in this area. On a regional level, African countries are endeavouring to
present a common, united front so as to facilitate concessions in their
favour from the developed market economies. This may ultimately lead to
the recognition of a legal obligation owed by the developed nations to
promote economic growth in Africa. African states have also accepted the
need for a new strategy for regional development which will lessen their
dependence on the developed nations through the achievement of regional
co-operation and integration. However, this strategy remains essentially
a political one and the problem of translating it into a legally binding
plan remains unsolved. Consequently the 'right to development' while
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clearly gaining in importance on both the international plane and in a
regional context with regard to Africa, cannot yet be-said to have
attained the status of a legal right.
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